The independence of the judiciary in Singapore is protected by the Constitution, laws such as the Law of State Courts and the Supreme Court of Justice Act, and general law. The independence of the judiciary is the principle that the judiciary must be separated from the legislative and executive powers, and protected from unnecessary pressure from these branches of government, and from private or partisan interests. This is very important because it serves as a foundation for the rule of law and democracy.
To maintain judicial independence, Singapore law sets out specific procedures to be followed before Supreme Court justices can be discussed in Parliament and for their dismissal from office by mistake, and provides that their remuneration can not be reduced during their tenure. By law, court officials from the District Court, and the Registrar, Deputy Registrars and Supreme Court registry assistants have immunity from civil suits, and are forbidden to hear and decide cases in which they are personally interested. The general law provides the same protection and disability for Supreme Court justices. Neither the District Court nor the Supreme Court have the power to punish for defamation of the courts, even though only the Supreme Court can punish those who commit the offense of the courts.
The Chief Judge and other Supreme Court judges are appointed by the President acting on the advice of the Cabinet. The President should consult the Chief Judge when appointing another judge, and may use his personal discretion to refuse to make an appointment if he disagrees with the Cabinet's suggestion. Supreme Court presidents enjoy the security of tenure until the age of 65 years, after which they stop serving. However, the Constitution allows the judge to be reappointed on a periodic basis, as well as for judicial commissioners to be appointed for a limited period, including a single case trial. Court officials from the District Court are also appointed on a term basis by the Legal Services Commission (LSC), and may be transferred from the courts to other government departments to act as legal officers, and otherwise . It has been claimed that this creates the risk of executive interference, although a 1986 investigation of the allegations found no evidence of this.
The court conducts a judicial review of executive actions and legislation to comply with the Constitution, empowering laws and administrative law principles. Although it has been noted that there is a low incidence of judicial disagreements with the executive, this may not be evidence of improper executive to it but it may be only that the executive has reached a high degree of fairness in his decision-making. The fact that a large number of defamation cases involving Government opponents has been decided to support the Government and members of the ruling People's Action Party has led to criticism that impartial trials. On the other hand, it has been shown that defendants in such cases have not succeeded in proving the truth of allegedly defamatory facts.
Video Judicial independence in Singapore
Theory of judicial independence
Importance
The independence of the judiciary serves as a safeguard for the rights and privileges granted by the Constitution and prevents the executive and legislative exclusion of those rights. It serves as a basis for the rule of law and democracy. The rule of law means that all authority and power must come from the highest source of law. Under an independent judicial system, the courts and their officers are free from improper intervention in judicial affairs. With this independence, the judiciary can protect human rights and freedoms which guarantee equal protection for all.
The legal effectiveness and respect that people have for law and government that enforce it depends on judicial independence to make fair decisions. Furthermore, this is the pillar of economic growth because multinational businesses and investors have the confidence to invest in the economy of a nation with a strong and stable justice that is not affected by interference. The role of the judiciary in deciding the validity of presidential and parliamentary elections also requires the independence of the judiciary.
Losses
The disadvantages of having a seemingly too independent judiciary include the possibility of abuse of power by a judge. Personal interests, ideological dedication and even corruption can influence judges' decisions without checks and balances in place to prevent abuse of this power if the judiciary is truly independent. The relationship between judicial and executive is a series of complex dependencies and interdependencies that are opposed to each other and must be carefully balanced. One can not be too independent from the others. Furthermore, executive judicial support is not so negative as it may seem as an executive is a branch of government with the greatest claim to democratic legitimacy. If the judicial and executive institutions are constantly at odds, no government can function properly.
Also, a highly independent judiciary will lack judicial accountability, which is the task of public decision-makers to explain and justify decisions and to make changes in which decisions lead to injustice or harm. Judges are not required to provide all explanations of their reasons behind decisions, and are protected against public scrutiny and protected from legal effects. But judicial accountability can strengthen judicial independence because it can show that judges have good reasons and reasons to arrive at a particular decision. While judges are not democratically accountable to the people, the key is the judge to strike a balance between the two to ensure that justice is upheld.
Maps Judicial independence in Singapore
Legal protection
Section VII of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore is the main law protecting the independence of Supreme Court judges. Article 93 punishes judicial power in court without placing any restrictions on how it can be done in matters within the jurisdiction of the courts, which shows the recognition and acceptance of the judiciary as an independent institution in Singapore. Section VII also provides other legislative safeguards that serve as a protective wall against external pressure. This safeguard framework can not be altered unless such amendment is supported in the Second and Third Reading of the constitutional amendment bill by a vote of no less than two thirds of all elected Members of Parliament.
Other laws that provide protection for the independence of the judiciary, in particular the judicial officers of the Supreme Court and judicial officers of the District Court, including the Justice Act (Reporting Regulation), the Law on Legal Aid and Advice, the Legal Profession Act, , and the Supreme Court of Judicature Act. In addition, under the Code of Conduct for the legal officers of the Prosecutor General's Chamber of Commerce are required, inter alia, "to maintain and improve proper judicial administration".
Appointment of a judge
The Supreme Court Justices are appointed by the President acting on the advice of his Cabinet. The President uses his personal wisdom to refuse to make an appointment if he disagrees with the Cabinet's suggestion. Supreme Court Justices should be consulted, although it is unclear how much weight it carries. It has been noted that current constitutional arrangements allow "[a] well-intentioned Executives, to sincerely believe in the justice and legitimacy of their government programs,... to appoint Judges who, in essence, believe in the same fundamental policy." The problem is that this is anathema to the logic of separation of powers, directed by the potential for abuse or abuse of power. "It is possible for an executive" determined to maintain his power at any cost "to control the judicial appointment process as a whole, which would be undesirable as this would result in a bench filled a dutiful judge. On the other hand, alternative judicial appointment methods have their own problems such as the possibility that judges can not be appointed because decision-makers can not agree on the issue. As former Australian Supreme Court Justice Harry Gibbs points out:
The Judicial Commission, the advisory committee and the procedure for consultation will all be in vain unless there is, among politicians of all sides, an awareness that the public interest demands that neither political nor personal patronage nor the desire to appease any part of society should play what part even in making a legal promise.
The current judicial appointment system may also lead to Bench enjoying legitimacy as it is in line with public opinion. Positive results can be cohesive states with judicial and interdependent executives in which the judiciary is unlikely to be overactive and the executive pays with regard to legislation.
Judge removal
In Singapore, a judge can only be removed due to a behavioral error or incompetence. The removal of a Supreme Court judge can only be made on the recommendation of the courts of his colleagues. Such a system is arguably better than a politician's firing system in securing judicial independence because there will be less exploitation by politicians trying to influence judges.
Ownership security
Justices of the Supreme Court
According to Alexander Hamilton, the security of judicial office control is important for judicial independence, since appointments requiring periodic renewal by the executive or legislature allow the judiciary to rule over these branches of government. While Supreme Court judges in Singapore have no lifetime tenure, they have a tenure security until age 65, after which they stop holding office.
A person who has terminated the office of a judge may be appointed as a Supreme Court Judge or may sit as a High Court Judge or Appellate Judge for a designated period as directed by the President if he agrees in his personal wisdom with the Prime Minister's advice on this matter. In addition, to facilitate the release of business in the Supreme Court, judicial commissioners may be appointed for a limited period, including one case trial. This is generally done to deal with the accumulation of cases, or to test the suitability of a judicial commissioner for appointment as a judge. Although judicial commissioners do not enjoy assurances of ownership, they share the same power and enjoy the same immunity as the Supreme Court justices. It has been suggested that the risk that the judge can not act independently is reduced by public scrutiny of a court decision and the fact that it is for the benefit of the judge, for future appointment, if he must act independently in accordance with the law. Also, independence issues usually will not arise because most disputes decided by the judicial commissioner will not involve the other government's hands.
District Court Judge
District judges and district judges from the District Court were appointed to their positions by the Legal Services Commission (LSC) on a time basis, and did not enjoy the security of ownership. These judges may be transferred by LSC from court to other government departments to act as legal officers, and otherwise . This can be said to create the risk of executive interference. The transfer of District Senior Judge Michael Khoo is often cited as this illustration. Member of Parliament Opposition J.B. Jeyaretnam and one other defendant were each charged with three counts for fraudulently transferring checks to prevent the distribution of money to Singaporean Labor's creditors, and one charge for making false statements. In January 1981, Khoo freed the defendants from all charges except for one count of fraud involving an examination of S $ 400. He sentenced Jeyaretnam to a $ 1,000 fine, which was under $ 2,000 which would cause him to lose his seat in Parliament. After the appeal of the Public Prosecutor to the Court of Appeal, Chief Judge Wee Chong Jin ordered that both charges on the allegations of fraud be alleged that the defendant had been released. In August 1981, before the retrial, Khoo was transferred to the Prosecutor General's Chamber to take the appointment as deputy public prosecutor. The defendants were convicted on charges by different senior district judges and sentenced to three months imprisonment each. Jeyaretnam and his colleagues then appealed to the High Court, affirming their conviction but reduced the penalty to a $ 5,000 fine each. However, a commission of inquiry held in 1986 to examine Khoo's transfer determined that no evidence of executive interference in the District Court had been presented, and that the transfer had been decided by the Supreme Court in consultation with the Attorney General. It did not investigate why the transfer was done. In the Parliament debate before and after the investigation, it is suggested on the one hand that the transfers are routine and timed coincidentally, and on the other hand that they are related to Khoo's competence in handling the case. Reasons for removal are never clear.
While the potential for executive interference exists due to LSC control over the prosecution of Court courts, it has been commented that in a small country like Singapore it may be impractical to have separate judicial and legal services. Also, the appointment process may not adversely affect the independence of the lower courts because the Supreme Court Justice, who is not part of the executive or legislature, is the head of the LSC and has a final decision on the post judiciary.
Remuneration
Appropriate remuneration is important for the independence of the judiciary as "the power over the amount of a man's subsistence to power over his will". In Singapore, the remuneration of Supreme Court judges is constitutionally protected because it can not be reduced during the term of office. In addition, the amount of remuneration is sufficient to provide a judge of a standard of living in accordance with their position in the community. Such measures prevent judicial corruption, which would undermine judicial independence, as low-paid judges are more likely to succumb to bribes from interested parties. However, the Constitution does not prevent the Government from instituting a policy of giving positive incentives by increasing the salary of the judiciary every time a decision is made. There is no evidence that this has happened.
Immunity from civil charges
Immunity from lawsuits for acts or omissions in the performance of judicial duties may encourage judicial independence in their decision-making. The State Court Act (SCA) states that a court official from State Courts - that is, a district judge, a judge, a coroner or a registrar - can not be prosecuted for any action he or she performs in the course of his trial, whether the judge acting within the bounds of his jurisdiction, provided that at the time he in good faith believes he has jurisdiction to commit or order a complained action. There is no corresponding legal provision applicable to the Supreme Court justices, but in general law, a high court judge enjoys absolute immunity from individual civil liability in respect of the judicial act he performs in his capacity as a judge. Immunity extends to actions taken outside the jurisdiction of the judge, as long as he acts reasonably and believes in good faith that the act is within his power. Such as court officials from the District Court, Clerks, Deputy Registrars, Assistant Registrars and others acting legally in the Supreme Court are granted immunity from civil litigation.
Steps to protect respect and support for justice
The conduct of judges of the Supreme Court can not be discussed in Parliament, except in the substantive movement whose notices have been granted no less than a quarter of the total number of MPs. In the Singapore context, given the majority of seats held by the ruling party and the existing whip system, it is not difficult for 25% of the requirements to be achieved. The procedure has not been requested to date.
In addition, the law stipulates that the Court of Appeal and the Court of Appeals have the power to punish for defamation of the courts. It has been interpreted by the court to include punishing a person for punishing a court when he is not in the physical presence of a judge and in a context unrelated to things pending before the Supreme Court. On the other hand, the District Court has only the power to punish derogatory acts or words spoken before the court or in connection with court proceedings.
The judge does not act if personally interested
To maintain public confidence in the judiciary, it is important to maximize the independence of judges from personal interests, beliefs and prejudices, and ensure that they are not deemed to be influenced by their personal beliefs and prejudices. The Law of the State Courts and the Supreme Court of Justice ("SCJA") stipulates that judicial officers of the District Court, and the Registrar, Deputy Registrars and Supreme Court registry assistants, are not permitted to investigate or hear and decide on any proceedings for or where they are interested parties or persons, unless the parties in the process have agreed and the Supreme Court has given their consent.
In addition, judges should be independent of the pressures provided by third parties such as the general public, the media and non-governmental organizations. In order to minimize direct third party influence on judges, SCA and SCJA stipulate that judicial officers from the District Court, and the Registrar, Deputy Registrars and Supreme Court registry assistants, can not take the emolug office (ie, paid positions), run any business directly or indirectly, or receive fees for any office, additional income, honorarium or benefits other than their salary and benefits. While judges can not join private legal practice during their term of office, Singapore law does not prohibit judges who retire or retire to return to private practice. It has been argued that this has led to potential executive interference with judicial independence to be counterproductive, and may provide more confidence judges to decide disputes without fear or support.
The SCJA does not contain provisions similar to those mentioned above that apply to Supreme Court justices. However, in the common law, a judge may be disqualified from hearing or deciding on a case if he is completely biased towards a party, or appears biased. The test for a clear bias is whether a reasonable and sound-minded person sits in court and knows all the relevant facts will have a reasonable suspicion that a fair trial for the plaintiff is impossible.
In practice
Judicial review
Article 4 of the Constitution states: "This Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic of Singapore and any law adopted by the Legislature after the start of this Constitution which is inconsistent with this Constitution shall, to the extent of inconsistency, be void." Regarding the laws in force before the Constitution entered into force on 9 August 1965, Article 162 states that they continue to apply after the start of the Constitution but must be interpreted with the modifications, adaptations, qualifications and exceptions as necessary to bring them in accordance with the Constitution. Although none of these Articles expressly grant power to the courts to impose unconstitutional or unconstitutional executive judgments, the Court of Appeal held in the 1994 case of Chan Hiang Leng Colin v. Public Prosecutor :
The court has the power and obligation to ensure that the provisions of the Constitution are observed. The Court also has an obligation to declare any invalidity of any executive, legislative and executive exercise, which exceeds the limits of powers granted by the Constitution, or that is contrary to any prohibition provided by the Constitution.
In addition, the courts have the power of judicial review to correct or cancel executive actions or decisions that are contrary to the executive legal powers or are contrary to the principles of administrative law. The low incidence of judicial disputes with executives in Singapore has been noted by commentators, but may not mean that the judiciary is too subject to the executive. It may be that the executive has reached a high degree of fairness in his own decision making. In 1989, Parliament deliberately limited the ability of the courts to carry out a review of executive decisions made in accordance with the Internal Security Act.
Legal interpretation
When it comes to interpreting the law, the judge is expected to abide by the rules established by the Legislature. On 26 February 1993, the Interpretation (Amendment) Act 1993 was passed to reform the law relating to the interpretation of the law. The Amendments Act inserts section 9A into the Interpretation Act, which mandates that judges take a purposive approach to interpreting written law by requiring that interpretations promoting the objectives or objects underlying the law are favored rather than those that do not promote a goal or object. In determining the meaning of the written law provisions, the court may consider extrinsic material, that is, materials that are not part of the written law. Such material includes speeches made in Parliament by a minister during the Second Reading of a bill containing the provisions, and other relevant material in any official note of the Parliament debate. Through section 9A, Parliament requires judges to determine the meaning of the written law by understanding the Parliament's intentions underlying its law and objectives. Therefore, the freedom of judges when it comes to interpretation by law is somewhat limited. However, it can be said that respect for the Parliament is essential to uphold the rule of law and to avoid defeating the Parliament's intention in enacting the law.
Criminal process
In Singapore, where the level of confidence for criminal offenses is high, exemption is the same as the courts rejecting the executive's establishment of a party's fault. Although it has been suggested that a low level of liberation is evidence of a lack of judicial independence, it is also consistent with a rigorous prosecution process that only takes action against people who are actually guilty, so even the fairest and most independent judges will decide to punish.
Strict supervision of the criminal justice system occurs when a person on trial is a political opponent of the executive government. The relevant question here, which is very difficult to answer, is whether a judge presiding over a particular case will arrive at his decision in a different way if the defendant is not a political opponent. However, the impartiality of the judiciary can not always be affirmed on the grounds that the courts should enforce laws or rules of evidence and procedures that are perceived to be unfair, since even the most independent courts must comply with laws passed by the legislature.
Defamation settings
Government leaders have historically used litigation, particularly defamation charges against political opponents and critics, leading to the perception that the court reflects the party's ruling view in politically sensitive cases. According to a 1996 report by Dato 'Param Cumaraswamy, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, allegations of independence and impartiality of the Singapore courts "can come from the number of cases won by the Government or members of the ruling party both in defamation of litigation or defamation lawsuits filed against the critics of the Government, be they individuals or the media ". Similar allegations have been made by other commentators. The US State Department claims that the President of Singapore and the Minister of the Interior have considerable judicial powers, leading "to the perception that the judiciary reflects the views of the ruling party in politically sensitive cases." In addition, "judicial officials Singapore, especially the Supreme Court, has close ties to the ruling party and its leaders ". The President appoints the judge to the Supreme Court on the recommendation of the Prime Minister and consults with the Chief Justice. The President also appoints subordinate judges on the recommendation of the Chief Justice.
Critical cases include those opposing opposition leaders J. B. Jeyaretnam and Chee Soon Juan. In 1997, Q.C. Australia Stuart Littlemore observes the defamation litigation filed by Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong against Jeyaretnam on behalf of the Geneva-based International Commission of Jurist Physics (ICJ). This was followed by his ICJ report stating that the Singapore courts were in accordance with the ruling People's Action Party (PAP), observations rejected by the Department of Justice, and the ICJ later defended. Littlemore's appeal to represent Chee Soon Juan in 2002 due to another defamation suit was denied by the Court of Appeal because of previous statements about the judiciary seen as insulting and disrespectful.
Source of the article : Wikipedia
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