Carl Philipp Gottfried (or Gottlieb ) von Clausewitz ( ; June 1, 1780 - November 16, 1831) is a Prussian general and military theories that emphasize the "moral" aspect (meaning, in the modern, psychological sense) and the politics of war. His most important work, Vom Kriege ( On War ), was not completed at the time of his death. Clausewitz is a realist in many different meanings and, while in some ways romantic, is also very interested in the rationalist ideas of the European Enlightenment.
Clausewitz's thinking is often described as Hegelian because of his dialectical method; but, although he may personally be acquainted with Hegel, there is still some debate over whether Clausewitz is actually influenced by him or not. He emphasized the dialectical interaction of various factors, noting how unexpected developments took place under the "fog of war" (ie, in the face of incomplete, dubious, and often entirely false information and high levels of fear, doubt, and excitement) called for quick decisions by alert commander. He sees history as an important examination of scientific abstraction that is incompatible with experience. Unlike the early work of Antoine-Henri Jomini, he argues that war can not be measured or reduced to maps, geometry, and graphics. Clausewitz has many words of pearl, the most famous of which is "War is a continuation of politics by other means."
Video Carl von Clausewitz
Name
The Christian names of Clausewitz are sometimes given in non-German sources such as Karl, "Carl Philipp Gottlieb," or "Carl Maria." He spelled his own name with "C" to identify with the classical Western tradition; writers who use "Karl" often try to emphasize their German identity (not Europe). "Carl Philipp Gottfried" appeared on the tombstone of Clausewitz. Nevertheless, sources such as the military historian Peter Paret and EncyclopÃÆ'Â|dia Britannica use Gottlieb instead of Gottfried.
Maps Carl von Clausewitz
Military life and career
Clausewitz was born on June 1, 1780 at Burg bei Magdeburg in the Prussian Duchy of Magdeburg as the fourth and youngest son of a middle-class family, although it made a claim of the glorious status that Carl received. The Clausewitz family claimed the descendants of the Barons of Clausewitz in Upper Silesia, though scholars questioned his relationship. His grandfather, the son of a Lutheran priest, was a professor of theology. Clausewitz's father, who had been a lieutenant in Prussia Frederick II's army of Prussia (Frederick the Great), held a small post on Prussian's internal revenue service. Clausewitz entered the Prussian military service at the age of twelve as Corporal-Lance, finally reaching the rank of Major General.
Clausewitz served in the Rhine Campaign (1793-1794) including the Mainz Siege, when the Prussian army invaded France during the French Revolution, and fought in the Napoleonic Wars from 1806 to 1815. He entered the Kriegsakademie (also called the "School of War Germany "," Military Academy in Berlin ", and" Prussian Military Academy ") in Berlin in 1801 (aged 21), probably studied the writings of the philosopher Immanuel Kant, and won the award of General Gerhard von Scharnhorst, the first Prussian Army chief of staff newly established (lifted 1809). Clausewitz, Hermann von Boyen (1771-1848) and Karl von Grolman (1777-1843) were among Scharnhorst's main allies in his attempts to reform the Prussian army between 1807 and 1814.
Clausewitz served during the Jena Campaign as an aide-de-camp for the August Prince. At the Battle of Jena-Auerstedt on October 14, 1806 - when Napoleon invaded Prussia and defeated the Prussian-Saxon army commanded by Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand, Duke of Brunswick - he was arrested, one of the 25,000 prisoners taken that day as Prussia's army was destroyed. He is 26 years old. Clausewitz was imprisoned with his prince in France from 1807 to 1808. Returning to Prussia, he assisted in the reform of the army and the state of Prussia.
On December 10, 1810 he married the socially prominent Countess Marie von BrÃÆ'¼hl, whom he first met in 1803. He was a member of the German noble von BrÃÆ'¼hl family of Thuringian origin. The couple moved into the highest circle, socializing with Berlin's politics, literature and intellectuals. Marie is highly educated and has good political connections - she plays an important role in the advancement of her husband's career and his intellectual evolution. He also edits, publishes, and introduces his collected works.
Against the alliance imposed by Prussia with Napoleon I, Clausewitz abandoned Prussian troops and served in the Russian Imperial Army from 1812 to 1813 during the Russian Campaign, taking part in the Battle of Borodino (1812). Like many Prussian officers serving in Russia, he joined the Russian-German Legion in 1813. In the Russian Empire's service, Clausewitz helped negotiate the Tauroggen Convention (1812), which prepared the way for the Prussian, Russian and British coalitions that ultimately defeated Napoleon and his allies.
In 1815, the Russian-German Legion was integrated into the Prussian Army and Clausewitz re-entered Prussian service as a colonel. He was soon appointed chief of staff of Corps III Johann von Thielmann. In that capacity he served at the Battle of Ligny and the Battle of Wavre during the Waterloo Campaign in 1815. A privately-led troop by Napoleon defeated the Prussians at Ligny (south of Mont-Saint-Jean and Waterloo village) on June 16, 1815, but the failure of Napoleon to destroy Prussian troops led to his defeat a few days later at the Battle of Waterloo (18 June 1815), when Prussian troops suddenly arrived on his right wing in the afternoon to support the Anglo-Dutch - the Belgian forces pressed on his front. The Clausewitz unit fought in Wavre (18-19 June 1815), preventing the great reinforcements reaching Napoleon in Waterloo. After the war Clausewitz served as director of the Kriegsakademie, where he served until 1830. That year he returned with army duties. Soon after, the outbreak of several revolutions across Europe and the crisis in Poland seemed to be a sign of another major European war. Clausewitz was appointed chief of staff of the only Prussian troop capable of mobilizing in this emergency, sent to the Polish border. His commander, Gneisenau, died of cholera (August 1831), and Clausewitz took command of the Prussian army's attempts to build a cordon sanitaire to contain the epidemic of cholera (the first time cholera appeared in the modern heart). Europe, causing panic across the continent). Clausewitz himself died of the same disease shortly afterwards, on 17 November 1831.
His widow edited, published, and wrote an introduction to the magnum opus on the philosophy of war in 1832. He wrote the introduction to On War and in 1835 has published most of his collected works. He died in January 1836.
The war theory
Clausewitz is a professional combat soldier involved in many military campaigns, but he is best known primarily as a military theorist interested in war examinations, utilizing Frederick the Great and Napoleon's campaigns as a frame of reference for his work. He wrote a careful, systematic, philosophical war examination in all its aspects. The result is the main book, On War, masterpiece on the philosophy of war. It was not finished when Clausewitz died and contained material written at different stages in his intellectual evolution, resulting in several significant contradictions between different parts. The exact sequence and character of the evolution is the source of much debate, as well as the exact meaning behind its seemingly contradictory claims (discussions relating to the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war are one example). Clausewitz continues to attempt to revise the text, particularly between 1827 and his departure at his last assignment, to include more material about "people's wars" and other forms of war in addition to the intense high-intensity war between nations, but relatively little of this material is included in the book. Soldiers before this time have written treatises on various military subjects, but none of these have done great philosophical war testing on a scale written by Clausewitz and Leo Tolstoy, both inspired by the events of the Napoleonic Era.
Clausewitz's work is still being studied today, showing its continuing relevance. More than sixteen major English-language books focusing specifically on his work were published between 2005 and 2014, while his 19th-century rival, Jomini, faded from influence. Historian Lynn Montross says the result, "can be explained by the fact that Jomini produces a war system, Clausewitz philosophy, which is obsolete by new weapons, others still influence the strategy behind those weapons." Jomini is not trying to define war. Clausewitz performs, provides (and compares dialects) a number of definitions. The first is his dialectical thesis: "War is an act of force to force our enemy to do our will." The second, often treated as Clausewitz's 'bottom line', is in fact only his dialectical antithesis: "War is simply a continuation of policy by other means." The synthesis of his dialectical examination of the nature of war is his famous "trinity", which says that war is "an interesting trinity - composed of primordial violence, hatred and hostility, which must be regarded as a blind natural force, a game of chance and probability, at where the creative spirit is free to roam, and the subordinate element, as a policy instrument, makes it subject to pure reason. "Christopher Bassford says the best abbreviation for the Clausewitz trinity should be something like" emotional abuse/opportunity/rational calculation. " However, it is often presented as a "person/soldier/government," a misunderstanding based on later paragraphs in the same chapter. This error was popularized by the interpretation of the US Army era of Harry Summers' Vietnam, facilitated by a weakness in the 1976/Paret translation.
The extent to which Clausewitz managed to revise his manuscript to reflect that synthesis is the subject of much debate. His ultimate references to war and politics, however, transcend his widely quoted antithesis: "War is only a continuation of political relations with the addition of other means.We deliberately use the phrase" with the addition of other means "because we also want makes it clear that the war itself does not stop political relations or turn it into something completely different. In important matters that sexual intercourse continues, regardless of the means it uses. The main lines through which military events take place, and where they are restricted, are the political lines that continue throughout the war to the next peace. "
Clausewitz introduced a systematic philosophical contemplation into Western military thought, with powerful implications not only for historical writing and analysis but also for practical policy, military instruction, and operational planning. He relied on his own experiences, contemporary writings on Napoleon, and on deep historical research. His historiographical approach proved in his first long study, written when he was 25 years old, from the Thirty Years' War. He rejected the Enlightenment view of war as a chaotic mess and instead explains the protracted operations by the economic and technological times, the social characteristics of troops, and the politics and psychology of the commander. In Clausewitz, Clausewitz sees all war as a number of decisions, actions, and reactions in an uncertain and dangerous context, as well as a socio-political phenomenon. He also emphasizes the complex nature of the war, which includes both socio-political and operational and emphasizes the primacy of state policy.
The word "strategy" has just been used in modern Europe, and Clausewitz's definition is quite narrow: "the use of engagements for the object of war." Clausewitz considers war as a possible political, social, and military phenomenon - depending on circumstances - involving the entire population of a country in war. In any case, Clausewitz sees military power as an instrument that states and other political actors use to pursue policy goals, in dialectics between opposing wills, each with the aim of imposing its policy and its will on its enemy.
Clausewitz's emphasis on the inherent superiority of defenses suggests that the accustomed aggressor tends to end up as a failure. The inherent superiority of defense certainly does not mean that defenders will always win, but: there are other asymmetries to consider. He is interested in the cooperation between the regular army and the militia or partisan troops, or the citizen army, as one of the possible - sometimes sole - defense methods. In the wake of the French Revolutionary War and with Napoleon, filled with the spirit of nationalism, he stressed the need for states to engage their entire population in battle. This is very important, because this war suggests that such energies can be very decisive and temporarily lead to democratization of the armed forces such as the politics of universal suffrage.
While Clausewitz is well aware of the value of intelligence at all levels, he is also very skeptical of the accuracy of many military intelligence: "Many intelligence reports in the war are contradictory, even more false, and largely uncertain.... In short, most intelligences are wrong. "This situation is generally described as part of the fog of war. Such skeptical comments apply only to intelligence at the tactical and operational levels; at a strategic and political level he constantly emphasizes the requirement for the best possible understanding of what today is called strategic and political intelligence. His conclusions are influenced by his experience in the Prussian Army, which is often in the intelligence fog partly because of the superior capabilities of the Napoleonic system, but even more to the nature of war. Clausewitz admits that friction creates great difficulties for realizing any plan, and the fog blocks the commander from knowing what is going on. It is precisely in the context of this challenge that he develops the concept of military genius, whose abilities are seen above all in the conduct of operations. 'Military genius' is not just a matter of intellect, but a combination of quality intelligence, experience, personality, and temperament (and there are many possibilities of such combinations) that create a highly developed mental intelligence to wage war.
Main ideas
The key ideas discussed in On War include:
- the dialectical approach to military analysis
- the "critical analysis" method
- the logic of seeking economic benefits from the same commercial enterprise applies to wars and negotiates for peace
- the nature of the power balance mechanism
- the relationship between political goals and military goals in war
- the asymmetric relationship between attack and defense
- the nature of "military genius" (involving personality and character issues, beyond intelligence)
- "interesting trinity" ( wunderliche Dreifaltigkeit ) war
- the philosophical distinction between "absolute war," "ideal war," and "real war"
- in "real war," typical pole a) limited destination war and b) war to "make the enemy powerless"
- "war" fundamentally goes into the social realm - rather than into the realm of art or science
- "strategy" belongs primarily to the art world, but is limited by quantitative analysis of political gain versus military & amp; loss
- "tactics" mainly belong to the world of science (most evident in the development of siege warfare)
- the importance of "moral power" (more than "moral") as opposed to quantifiable quantifiable elements
- "military virtues" from professional soldiers (who do not have to overcome a kindness different from other types of combat power)
- on the contrary, the very real effect of excellence in numbers and "mass"
- important unpredictable war
- "fog" war
- "friction" - the difference between the ideal performance of units, organizations or systems and their actual performance in a real-world scenario (Book I, Chapter VII)
- the strategic and operational "gravity" center "
- "offensive peak"
- "the winning point of victory"
Interpretation and misinterpretation
Clausewitz used the dialectical method to build his argument, which led to frequent misinterpretations of his ideas. British military theorist BH Liddell Hart argues that enthusiastic acceptance by the Prussian military establishment - notably Moltke the Elder, his former pupil - from what they believe to be Clausewitz's idea, and the widespread adoption of Prussia's military system worldwide, has devastating effects on theory and practice military, because of their misinterpretation of his ideas:
As is often the case, Clausewitz's disciples take their teachings in an extreme that their master does not mean. The theory of war [Clausewitz] is described in a way that is too abstract and involved for the mind of the ordinary, basically concrete warrior, to follow his course of argument - which often reverses from the apparently leading direction. Impressed yet caught, they grasped their clear key phrases, saw only the meaning of the surface, and lost their deeper currents of thought.
As described by Christopher Bassford, then professor of strategy at the National War College of the United States:
One of the major sources of confusion about Clausewitz's approach lies in his dialectical method of presentation. For example, Clausewitz's famous line that "War is only a continuation of politics by other means," (while Derekri ist eine bloÃÆ'Ÿe Fortsetzung der Politics mit anderen Mitteln ") while accurate to the extent, is not intended as a statement of fact. This is the antithesis in the dialectical argument whose thesis is the point - made earlier in the analysis - that "war is just a duel [or wrestling match, a better translation of Germany Zweikampf] on a larger scale." His synthesis, which resolves the lack of two bold statements, says that war is not "nothing but" violence or "just" political action or rational policy. This synthesis lies in its "dazzling trinity" [wunderliche Dreifaltigkeit]: dynamic interaction, inherently unstable from violent emotional forces, coincidence, and rational calculation.
Another example of this confusion is the notion that Clausewitz is a total war supporter as used in Third Reich propaganda in the 1940s. In fact, he never used the term "total war": rather, he addressed the "absolute war" or "ideal war" as a purely logical outcome of the forces underlying "pure ideals" Platonist "" war. In what he calls "logical fantasies," war can not be waged in a limited way: the rules of competition will force participants to use all the means they have to achieve victory. But in the real world, he says, such rigid logic is unrealistic and dangerous. As a practical matter, military objectives in real wars that support political goals generally fall into two broad types: "war to achieve limited goals"; and a war to "disarm" the enemy, "to make him politically impotent or impotent militarily." Thus the total defeat of the enemy may not be necessary, desirable, or even possible.
In modern times, the reconstruction of Clausewitzian theory becomes a matter of many disputes. One analysis was Panagiotis Kondylis, a Greek-German writer and philosopher, who opposed Raymond Aron's interpretations in Penser la Guerre, Clausewitz , and other liberal writers. According to Aron, Clausewitz was one of the first authors to condemn the militarism of Prussian and prone to war staff, based on Clausewitz's argument that "war is a continuation of politics by other means." In Theory of War, Kondylis claims that this is inconsistent with Clausewitzian thinking. He claims that Clausewitz is morally ignorant of war (though this may reflect a lack of familiarity with the personal letter of Clausewitz, which shows an acute awareness of the tragic aspects of war) and that his counsel on political domination over the behavior of war does not have to do with peaceful love ideas. For Clausewitz, war is just one of the unique ways sometimes applied to the eternal quest for power, from raison d'ÃÆ'â € tat in anarchist and insecure world.
Other famous writers who have studied the Clausewitz text and translated it into English are historians Peter Paret of the Institute for Advanced Study and Sir Michael Howard, and philosopher, musician and game theorist Anatol Rapoport. Howard and Paret edited the most widely used edition of On War (Princeton University Press, 1976/1984) and have produced comparative studies of Clausewitz and other theorists, such as Tolstoy. Bernard Brodie The "On War" Reading Guide, in Princeton's 1976 translation, expressed his interpretation of Prussian theory and gave the students an influential synopsis of this vital work.
The British military historian John Keegan attacked Clausewitz's theory in his book A History of Warfare. Keegan argues that Clausewitz assumes the existence of a state, but 'war predates the country, diplomacy and strategy by many millennia.'
Influence
Clausewitz died without completing On War , but despite this his ideas have been very influential in military theory and have a strong influence on German military thinking in particular. Later Prussian and German generals, such as Helmuth Graf von Moltke, are clearly influenced by Clausewitz: Moltke's widely quoted statement that "No campaign plan survives the first contact with the enemy" is a classic reflection of Clausewitz's insistence on the role of opportunity, Fog, "uncertainty, and interactivity in war.
Clausewitz's influence spread to British thought as well, though initially more as a historian and analyst than as a theorist. See for example Wellington's extended essay that discusses Clausewitz's study of the 1815 Campaign - the only serious discussion that Wellington wrote about the battle, widely discussed in 19th century England. Clausewitz's wider thought came to the surface following the British military catastrophe in the Boer War (1899-1902). One example of Clausewitzian's heavy influence in that era was Spenser Wilkinson, journalist, Chichele Military History Professor first at Oxford University, and perhaps the most prominent military analyst in Britain from c. 1885 to enter the interwar period. Another is the naval historian Julian Corbett (1854-1922), whose work reflects the profound obedience if idiosyncratic to the Clausewitz concept and often emphasizes Clausewitz's ideas about 'limited war' and the inherent power of defensive warfare. Corbett's practical strategic view is often in prominent public conflicts with Wilkinson - see, for example, Wilkinson's article "Strategy at Sea," The Morning Post, February 12, 1912. After the First World War, however, the British military commentator influential, BH Liddell Hart in 1920, incorrectly associated it with the doctrine of "total war" which during the First World War was accepted by many of the general staff of Europe and imitated by the British. Newer scholars usually see that war is so confusing in terms of political thinking that is in fact contrary to many of the About War. One of the most influential British Clausewitzians today is Colin S. Gray; historian Hew Strachan (like Wilkinson and Chichele Military History Professor at Oxford University, since 2001) has been an energetic supporter of Clausewitz's studies, but his own view of Clausewitz's ideas is somewhat ambivalent.
With some interesting exceptions (eg John McAuley Palmer, Robert M. Johnston, Hoffman Nickerson), Clausewitz had little influence on American military thinking before 1945 aside from English writers, although General Eisenhower and Patton were diligent readers. He influenced Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Vladimir Lenin, Leon Trotsky and Mao Zedong, and thus the Soviet and Communist traditions of China, as Lenin emphasized the inevitability of war among the capitalist countries in the era of imperialism and presented the armed struggle of class work as one- the only way to eliminate war. Since Lenin was an admirer of Clausewitz and called him "one of the great military writers," his influence on the Red Army was enormous. The Russian historian A.N. Mertsalov commented that "It is the irony of fate that the view in the Soviet Union is that Lenin formed his attitude towards Clausewitz, and that Lenin's dictum that war is a continuation of politics derived from this work [supposedly] anti-humanitarian anti-revolutionary." American mathematician Anatol Rapoport wrote in 1968 that Clausewitz as interpreted by Lenin forms the basis of all Soviet military thought since 1917, and quotes Marshal VD Sokolovsky:
In describing the essence of war, Marxism-Leninism took a point of departure from the premise that war was not a goal in itself, but a political tool. In his speech at Clausewitz's On War , Lenin emphasized that "Politics is the reason, and war is just a tool, not the opposite, as it is only to subdue the military's viewpoint for" politics. "
Henry A. Kissinger, however, describes Lenin's approach as that politics is a continuation of war in other ways, thus turning Clausewitz's argument "over his head."
Rapoport argues that:
The approval of Lenin of Clausewitz, probably derived from his obsession with the struggle for power. The whole Marxist concept of history is a successive struggle for power, especially among social classes. This continues to be applied by Lenin in various contexts. Thus the whole history of philosophy appears in Lenin's writings as the great struggle between "idealism" and "materialism". The fate of the socialist movement must be decided by the struggle between the revolutionaries and the reformists. Clausewitz's acceptance of the struggle for power as the essence of international politics must have made Lenin seem realistic.
Clausewitz directly influenced Mao Zedong, who read On War in 1938 and organized a seminar on Clausewitz for Party leadership in Yan'an. So the content of "Clausewitzian" in many of Mao's writings is not merely regurgitation of Lenin but reflects Mao's own in-depth study. The idea that war involves inherent "friction" that changes, to a greater or lesser extent, all previous arrangements, has become a common currency in areas such as business strategy and sports. The expression of the "fog of war" comes from Clausewitz's stress on how confusing warfare can seem when drowned in it. The term "center of gravity," used in the military context, comes from the use of Clausewitz, which he took from the Newtonian Mechanics. In the US military doctrine, "center of gravity" refers to the base of opposing forces at the operational, strategic, or political level, although this is only one aspect of the use of the term Clausewitz.
The end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century
The United States prevention strategy of the 1950s was strongly inspired by a reading by President Dwight Eisenhower about Clausewitz as a young officer in the 1920s. Eisenhower was deeply impressed by Clausewitz's example of the theoretical and ideal "absolute" war in Vom Krieg as a way of showing how absurd it is to attempt such a strategy in practice. For Eisenhower, the age of nuclear weapons has made what for Clausewitz in the early nineteenth century was only a theoretical vision that was likely too real in the mid-20th century. From Eisenhower's point of view, the best barrier to war is to show the world how horrible and horrific nuclear "absolute warfare" should be, then a series of nuclear tests published in the Pacific, giving first priority in defense budgets for nuclear weapons and weapons delivery systems conventional, and making publicly repeated statements that the United States is capable and willing at all times to use nuclear weapons. In this way, through the doctrine of massive retaliation and foreign policy concepts closely related to Brinkmanship, Eisenhower hopes to hold a credible vision of the Clausewitzian "absolute war" to obstruct the Soviet Union and/or China that once risked war or even conditions can lead to war with the United States.
After 1970, some theorists claimed that nuclear proliferation made the Clausewitzian concept obsolete after a period of the 20th century in which they dominated the world. John E. Sheppard, Jr., argues that by developing nuclear weapons, state-based conventional soldiers simultaneously perfect their original goals, destroy their own mirror image, and make themselves obsolete. No two forces use nuclear weapons with each other, instead of using conventional or proxy wars to settle disputes. If such conflicts do occur, both combatants may be destroyed. Strongly influenced by the war in Vietnam and with the antipathy of American strategist Henry Kissinger, American biologist, musician and theoretician Anatol Rapoport argued in 1968 that Clausewitzian's view of war was not only obsolete in the age of nuclear weapons, but also very dangerous because promoting "zero-sum paradigm" to international relations and "dissolution of rationality" among decision makers.
The late twentieth and early twentieth centuries have seen many examples of state troops seeking to suppress insurrection, terrorism, and other forms of asymmetric warfare. Clausewitz not only focuses on inter-state wars with well-defined soldiers. The Era of the French Revolution and Napoleon was full of revolutions, revolts and violence by "non-state actors", such as the war in France Vendà © and in Spain. Clausewitz wrote a series of "Lectures on the Little War" and studied the rebellion in Venden (1793-1796) and Tyrolean rebellion in 1809. In his book "Bekenntnisdenkschrift" in 1812, he called for "The Spanish War in Germany" "and devised a comprehensive guerrilla strategy to launch against Napoleon.In On War he entered a famous chapter on "The People in Arms."
One of Clausewitz's leading critics is the Israeli military historian Martin van Creveld. In his book The Transformation of War Creveld argues that the "Trinity" of Clausewitz's famous people, soldiers, and government is an old, state-based socio-political construction that quickly moves from the scene as a key player in the war, and that he (Creveld) has built a new "non-trinitarian" model for modern warfare. Creveld's work has a great influence. Daniel Moran replied, 'The most remarkable interpretation of the famous metaphor of Clausewitz must be from Martin van Creveld, who has declared Clausewitz an apostle of the Trinity War, meaning, incomprehensible, the wars of the state against the state and the army against the army, from which influence people are completely excluded. "Christopher Bassford goes a step further, noting that one only needs to read the paragraphs in which Clausewitz defines his Trinity to see that the words" people, "'soldiers,' and 'governments' do not appear the same once in the list of Trinity components.... The Creveld and Keegan Attacks on the Clausewitz Trinity are not just classic punches into the air, that is, the attack on Clausewitz's position does not occupy.This is also a futile assault on a concept that is quite useful in itself However, their failure to read the true words of the theory they attacked violently, and to understand its profound relevance to the phenomena they describe, is difficult to credit. "
Some have gone further and argued that Clausewitz's most famous saying, that war is a continuation of policy by other means, is not only irrelevant today but also historically unenforceable. For the views of opponents see Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century edited by Hew Strachan, and Andreas Herberg-Rothe.
At military academies, schools, and universities around the world, Clausewitz's literature is often read mandatory.
In popular culture
Literature
- 1945: In the novel Horatio Hornblower The Commodore , by C. S. Forester, the protagonist meets Clausewitz during the events surrounding the Riga defense
- 1945: In CS Lewis's Power of Power , Lord Feverstone (Dick Devine) defends violently cutting other professors by saying "[...] but then I take Clausewitz's view. most humane in the long run. " 1952: In the John Steinbeck novel East of Eden, Lee's character makes several references to Clausewitz in Chapter 43. 1955: In the novel of Ian Fleming Moonraker , James Bond reflects that he has achieved Clausewitz's first principle in securing his base, although this base is a connection for intelligence purposes and not military installations.
- 1977: In The Wars by Timothy Findley, a novel about a 19-year-old Canadian officer serving in the First World War, one of his fellow practitioners reads On War , and sometimes quotes some parts of it.
- 2000: In Ethan Stark's series of science fiction books by John G. Hemry, Clausewitz is often quoted by Private Mendoza and his father Lieutenant Mendoza to explain the events revealed during the series.
- 2004: Bob Dylan mentions Clausewitz on pages 41 and 45 of his book Chronicles: Volume One , saying that he has "terrible interests with these things," that "Clausewitz in some ways is a prophet "and reading Clausewitz can make you" take your own thinking a little less seriously. " Dylan says that Vom Kriege is one of the books he saw among what he found in his friend's private library when a young man played at The Gaslight Cafe in Greenwich Village.
Movies
- 1962: In Lawrence of Arabia, General Allenby (Jack Hawkins) argues for TE Lawrence (Peter O'Toole) that "I fight like Clausewitz, you fight like Saxe", to which Lawrence replied, "We have to do very well, do not we?"
- 1977: In Sam Peckinpah Iron Cross , Feldwebel Steiner (James Coburn) has an ironic conversation in the trenches in a hostile loophole with the Red Army advancing with his friend Corporal. Schnurrbart, where they refer to German philosophers and their views on war. Schnurrbart: "Clausewitz says, 'war is a continuation of state policy by other means.'" "Yes," Steiner said, facing the moat, "... by other means."
- 1978: In the East German television series Clausewitz's TV Scharnhorst is played by Bodo Wolf.
- 1980: East German television produces television biography, Clausewitz - Lebensbild eines preuÃÆ'Ÿischen General ( Clausewitz - A life description of a Prussian General ), with JÃÆ'¼rgen Reuter as Clausewitz , directed by Wolf-Dieter Panse. The film was released on DVD in 2016.
- 1995: In Crimson Tide , naval submarine officers discuss the meaning of quotation "War is a continuation of politics by other means." The executive officer (Denzel Washington) argues that Clausewitz's interpretation of the ideas by the captain (Gene Hackman) is too simple.
- 2004: In the Fall, set in the last days of the Third Reich, Hitler started Operation Clausewitz, as part of Berlin's last defense
- 2007: In Lions for Lambs , during military briefing in Afghanistan Lt. Col. Falco (Peter Berg) says: "Remember your von Clausewitz: 'Never invade the same enemy for too long or he will...'", "adapt to your tactics", equip another soldier
- 2009: In Law-Abiding Residents , Clausewitz is often quoted by Clyde Shelton (Gerard Butler), the main character.
- 2012: In the movie The Gatekeeper Ayalon quotes Clausewitz's definition of "victory" as improving one's political situation and gets one of the rare film laughs by describing military theory as "clever even though he does not seem to be Jew".
Video games
- The Paradox Development Studio's grand strategy game engine is named "Clausewitz Engine"
- In Civilization V: Brave New World , an autocratic country can adopt the principle of "Priest Clausewitz", giving the nation a temporary bonus for military attacks.
- In the game Napoleon: Total War , Clausewitz is available for recruitment as a highly ranked General for the Prussian faction.
See also
August Otto RÃÆ'¼hle von Lilienstern - Prussian officers from whom Clausewitz allegedly took, without acknowledgment, some important ideas (including about war as pursuing political goals) became famous in On War. However, ideas such as Clausewitz and Lilienstern share similarities derived from a common influence, namely Scharnhorst, who is Clausewitz's "second father" and a professional mentor.
References
Further reading
Scientific studies
Primary source
External links
- Mind Map of On War
- Clausewitz's homepage, a large amount of information.
- Corn, Tony. "Clausewitz in Wonderland", Policy Review , September 2006. This is an article that is hostile to "Clausewitz and Clausewitzians." See also replies by Clausewitz Homepage, "Clausewitz's PR Flack."
- The work by Carl von Clausewitz in Project Gutenberg
- Works based on or about Carl von Clausewitz in the Internet Archive
- Works by Carl von Clausewitz on LibriVox (public domain audiobook)
- Clausewitz's influence on Jomini's Le Prà © cu de l'Art de la Guerre
- Two Letter Up Strategies , addressed to Prussian staff-general, Major von Roeder, respectively 22 and 24 December 1827.
- Erfourth M. & amp; Bazin, A. (2014). Clausewitz Military Genius and #Human Dimensions. The Bridge.
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